Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Imagine that a terrorist armed with a bomb manages somehow to elude Israeli security and enters the Knesset with all 120 members present.  He says that he really only wants to kill the Prime Minister (in another room).  There is virtually no chance of overpowering the terrorist before he can detonate the bomb.  If the Israelis give him the Prime Minister, he will let the rest go.  If not, he will blow up the entire Knesset building including the Prime Minister and the other 119 members.  May one take the law into one’s own hands?  What if it is to react violently to personal anti-semitism – does that change anything? 

Answer

Should the Knesset members give up the Prime Minister to the terrorist or die themselves, along with the Prime Minister?  On the surface, it seems like a simple decision: saving 119 lives is certainly better preferable to losing 120 lives.  However, the Jewish value on life makes the decision much less clear.

[a] We are aware that it is written (Sanhedrin 37a) that “he who saves one life, it is as if he has saved an entire world.”  Thus, each life has the value of a world – each life has infinite value.  If one life has the value of infinity, then 120 lives also have the value of infinity (since any number multiplied by infinity is still infinity).  Therefore, based on the math and the general concept, it is not clear that 120 lives are more valuable than one life.

[b] Another Talmudic passage (Sanhedrin 74a) presents the case of a terrorist who puts a gun to your head, and orders you to kill another person or be killed.  One may not kill another person in that instance, even to save one’s own life.  The Talmud asks, “Who says that your blood is redder than his blood?” suggesting that no person can judge whose life is more valuable than whose.  By extension, we may ask, “Who says that any two or five people are more valuable than any one person?”

[c] It is for these reasons that Maimonides (Hilchot Yisodai ha-Torah 5:5) brings down our case, and rules that the Knesset Members would not be allowed to save their lives by giving the terrorist “just” the Prime Minister to be killed.  A person may not do anything to bring about the death of another human being.  The fact that terrorists will kill is their problem, and they will suffer for it, but any law-abiding Jew is forbidden to assist in killing.  Maimonides does bring one caveat, however.  If the Prime Minister (or the specific person being requested) is guilty of sins requiring his death, then (and only then) he may be handed over to the terrorists.  Short of that, nothing should be done, even if it means the death of everyone.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 60-62

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Note from Rabbi Faudem:  Other Rabbis say, if someone is singled out [by the terrorists], that is enough for the group to turn him over [to the terrorists] – and the group would not necessarily be guilty of sins requiring death (Talmud Yerushalmi, Terumot 8:4).

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Michael, a law abiding citizen, is walking in the city with his girlfriend and proudly wearing a Magen David around his neck.  Suddenly, a large man starts mocking Michael and his girlfriend because they are Jewish.  Speaking right at them, he utters phrases like “Hitler was right,” and “Make the Jews into lampshades.”  Michael has the urge to hit the man, even if he may be hurt in the fight.  He does not want the man to “get away” with such attacks against Jews.  On the other hand, Michael knows that starting a fight is against the law.  He also knows that there is a police station a block and a half away where he could file a complaint.

Answer

Is it justified, as a Jew, to ever physically stop someone from doing something illegal?  When the attack is verbal and anti-Semitic, does that change anything?

[a] Based on a casual glance at the stories in the Torah, we cannot draw any conclusions based on the evidence.  On the one hand, Simeon and Levi, who destroyed the city of Shechem following the kidnapping and rape of their sister Dinah, were strongly castigated by their father, Jacob (Genesis 34:30).  On the other hand, when idol worshippers perpetrated a great sin causing a plague that left 24,000 dead, Pinchas took the law into his own hands and killed them on the spot.  When he did so, he stopped the plague and was praised for his actions (Numbers 25:10-13).  What, then, is the correct reaction?

[b] When it comes to one’s property, there is a disagreement whether one can seize it back when it has been stolen.  The law codes (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 4) follow Rav Nachman’s opinion in the Talmud (Bava Kamma 27b) that one can seize property that has been stolen (especially when retrieval through lawful means is impossible), although Rabbi Yehudah disagrees.  But this case is not similar to our question.

[c] Based on the story of Pinchas, Maimonides codified the times when it is permitted to take the law into one’s own hands (Hilchot Issurei Biah 12:4-5).  There are four specific conditions which must be adhered to in reacting violently to hurt or destroy the guilty party: 1) It must be a public desecration of God’s name (usually before at least ten Jews); 2) It must take place in the heat of the moment, as an immediate reaction to the act, and not premeditated; 3) One may not consult or ask a Jewish legal authority for permission to commit such an act; 4) If the person who acts outside the law is injured or killed, relatives may not take legal action against the other party.  Therefore, returning to our case, it may indeed be proper or permissible to fight or use physical force against the anti-Semite if the above conditions are adhered to.  

[d] However, in general, the Jewish legal principle Dina D’Malchuta Dina covers this situation.  Dina D’Malchuta Dina means “The Law of the Land” is the law.  Unless (a) he would be at risk, or (b) unless that was a direct and significant danger to other people that would override the limits of local law, Michael would not be allowed to respond at that time.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 58-59

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A shootout between a mugger and a policeman results in the officer being wounded.  He is wheeled into the ER, and needs an operation to stop the internal bleeding.  His fellow police officers and his family are with him at the hospital; everyone is pushing for the officer to be treated right away.  Five minutes later, the criminal who shot him is also brought to the ER, having been shot by the policeman.  He is in much greater need of an operation.  The doctor on duty orders two operating rooms, but only one is available.

Answer

Should the doctor give the operating room to the criminal, who needs the operation more and whose life is in greater danger, or to the policeman, who is not a criminal and whose family is present, encouraging the doctor to treat him right away? 

[a] Of course, there is a general mitzvah to save the life of as many people as possible.  Even if the person is not an upstanding individual, he or she is created “in the image of God” – b’tzelem Elohim.  However, in our case, when only one operating room is available, the doctor must choose whom to save.  

Common sense tells us to save the policeman since 1) he is the more moral person and 2) he will continue to save lives if he survives, while the criminal might continue to hurt others.  But common sense and logic are not always the guiding principles when it comes to defining Jewish laws and values.

[b] Even though it is clear to us that the man is the perpetrator of a crime, no person or doctor may act as a judge and pronounce the person guilty prior to a legal trial.  This basic concept familiar to us as “innocent until proven guilty” is based on a verse in the Torah (Numbers 35:12) which states that punishment cannot be administered until after a trial.  Maimonides (Hilchot Rotzeach 1:5) says that no punishment may be administered by witnesses (even if they are judges by profession) at the scene of a crime, until a person has gone through the entire legal process.  Would the doctor, by choosing the policeman, already be pronouncing judgment on the alleged criminal?

[c] The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) teaches that a person is not permitted to say, or even to believe that one person’s “blood is redder than another’s.”  This means no human being is capable of judging who is more valuable than whom.  We cannot truly see inside a person to evaluate all of the conditions that led to particular behaviors.  Only God can do this.  Therefore, the doctor cannot decide who gets the operation room on past behavior or higher morality.  

[d] The Talmud discusses a case like ours (Sanhedrin 32b).  Two identical boats are traveling in opposite directions, trying to cross a narrow channel, which has room for only one boat.  The first option should be to compromise.  Failing that, the boat that is closer, that arrived first, goes first.  In our case, where compromise is impossible, the policeman should therefore be taken to the operating room because he arrived first.  However, the case of the boats is predicated on the situation where the needs are identical, but in our case the needs are not identical.  

[e] The person in greater danger of losing life always takes precedence, based on the dictum (Ketubot 12b), “a sure thing versus a possible thing – a sure thing is preferred.”  (Here the “sure thing” is the need for the operation in order to survive.)   Therefore, although intuitively we may WANT to save the policeman, the criminal should get the operating room, since both his need and his danger are greater.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2,” pgs. 55-57

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

https://www.hillel-detroit.org/wp-admin/post-new.php#edit_timestampCase

Mr. Kamen was the vice president of his synagogue, in charge of collecting tzedakah for community members in financial need.  One popular member, Mr. Kahn, was about to pay for his daughter’s wedding, but unbeknownst to his friends, he had just fallen on hard financial times.  Mr. Kahn secretly appealed to Mr. Kamen for help in making a modest wedding, and Mr. Kamen agreed to make an appeal without mentioning names.  When Mrs. Kamen overheard this, she begged her husband to publicly mention Mr. Kahn’s name in the appeal.  A general appeal to the congregation for helping a bride get married would only garner small donations.  However, Mr. Kahn’s popularity would bring in at least five times the amount.  

Answer

Should the cause of a tzedakah drive be made public, or should the recipients and purpose of the money remain a secret?

[a] The mitzvah of tzedakah is great indeed.  It is written that this mitzvah has the ability to grant life and death (Proverbs 10:2).  Maimonides calls it the most important positive mitzvah in the Torah (Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:1).  However, the importance of preserving a person’s dignity in the process of giving is paramount.  That is why the concept of the pushke (tzedakah box) was developed – so that neither the giver nor the receiver would know the identity of the other, thus preserving the dignity of the receiver.  Maimonides states that it is preferable to give less tzedakah than requested, but with a smile, than to give what is asked for by the poor person but with a dour face (Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 10:13-14).

[b] Although it is true that Mr. Kahn would receive far greater donations if his name were announced, he would suffer more shame.  His friends would now know of his financial plight.  That indignity is far worse than receiving less money.  Therefore, Mr. Kamen should not listen to his wife, and should omit Mr. Kahn’s name from his appeal.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 47-48

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A talk show host intentionally brings two groups onto his show in order to incite them.  One is a neo-Nazi fringe group and the other is a militant black group.  A fight naturally breaks out, and numerous people get injured.  They sue the talk show host for inciting this “riot.”  At the shabbat table, the Becker family discusses whether the host can be found guilty from a Jewish perspective.  On one hand, Judaism believes in free will, and each person is therefore a “free agent” to commit or not to commit any act.  Based on this argument, the talk show host is not guilty.  On the other hand, he intentionally brought these groups together to incite them to fight and improve ratings.  

Answer

Who is responsible for the violence that breaks out?

[a] It is true that from a Jewish perspective, each person above the age of bar or bat mitzvah is responsible for his or her own actions.  Maimonides teaches (Hilchot Kelayim 10:31) about a person who dresses another person in clothing that violates Jewish law. (Torah forbids Jews from wearing any fabric that mixes wool and linen.)  If the person being dressed is unaware of the nature of the sinful clothing and then the “clother” is guilty of the sin.  However, if the person being clothed was aware of the sinful clothing and did nothing to stop if, then he or she is indeed guilty.  Therefore, the rioters must indeed be responsible for their actions as well as any damage they caused.  They knew that violence was wrong.  But this does not necessarily exonerate the inciter (i.e. the “clother”) from being guilty as well.  Is the person who incites the sin also guilty?

[b] One of the commandments in the Torah is “You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14).  All of the commentaries understand that this verse refers to more than an actual blind person or an actual stumbling block.  It is expanded to refer to any person who knowingly causes another person to “stumble in any act or into any sin, while the sinner is “blind” to the sin as it is being committed.

[c] The Talmud (Avoda Zara 6b) refers to a case of a Nazarite who has taken an oath not to drink wine.  If you offer him wine, and he drinks it, then you have violated the prohibition against placing a stumbling block before the blind.  Here, the Nazarite certainly is aware of the sin, but is “blinded” by his desire to drink wine, which you facilitate.  

[d] The precedent for determining guilt for both the inciter and the actual sinner can be found in the very first sin in the Torah.  The serpent was severely punished for inciting the woman to violate God’s word by eating the fruit.  Soon after, we learn that Eve’s claim “I was just following orders” (Genesis 3:13-16) was not a legitimate defense and Eve was also punished.  So, too, the rioters may not claim that it is not their fault since they were goaded to sin.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 49-50

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Ruthie is passing by a street when a cat with a collar (indicating it has an owner) follows her.  She wants to pick it up and return it to its owner, but immediately realizes that it will take a lot of time, effort and money to give back this cat.  After all, in addition to the time it will take to care for her, Ruthie will have to feed her and pay for ads to let people know where the cat is.  

Answer

The question is about the obligation to return lost objects found on the street which would occupy much time and some expense.  

[a] In most societies, no one expects or requires anyone to pick up such an object.  If one does so it is viewed as so extraordinary that the returner expects a reward.  In Judaism, though, the returning of a lost object is mandatory, and a person is guilty of a sin if he or she merely passes by a lost object without retrieving it.  The Torah emphasizes this when it says “You shall not watch your neighbor’s ox or his sheep go astray, and hide yourself from them; you shall in any case bring them again to your neighbor.  And if your neighbor is not near you, or if you do not know your neighbor, then you shall bring it to your own house, and it shall be with you until your neighbor seeks it, and you shall return it.  In like manner shall you do with a donkey; and so shall you do with a garment; and with every lost thing of your neighbor’s, which that has been lost and you have found, you may not hide yourself from this responsibility.” (Deuteronomy 22:1-3) 

Since the verse specifically speaks about the return of lost animals, Ruthie would have to return the cat, especially since the collar is an identifying sign for the owner.  If there is no identifying sign, including the location in which the animal was found, then the finder can keep it since we assume the owner gave up all hope of retrieving such an object or animal (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 259:2).

[b] What about Ruthie’s expenses?  Of course the finder can later charge the owner for expenses such as feeding the animal (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 265:1).  Similarly, should Ruthie need to take time off work to find the owner, these expenses can also be recovered (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 265:1).  If the expenses become greater than the worth of the object, then (and only then) would the finder not be obligated to retain the object and try to return it.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 47-48

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Susie’s good friend Jane accidentally finds out a secret about Susie’s fiance Judah: he has a debilitating medical condition, which will result in his death within two years.  Judah has not told Susie, his-bride-to-be, about his condition.

Answer

Should a person reveal important, confidential information to a friend about her, if the fiance himself did not reveal it?

[a] In general, a Jew may not reveal information that is told to him or her, even if the provider of the information did not request that it be kept secret (Yoma 4b).  However, if the information will potentially save a life, then a person is obligated to reveal such information, even if sworn to secrecy (Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 426.1).  The values of trust and saving a life have to be weighed carefully here.

[b]  In the situation presented, which deeply affects the lives of the people involved, the Chofetz Chaim (Shemirat haLashon, 9:2, example 3, paragraph 7) states that the laws against speaking lashon hara (evil talebearing) do not apply.  Therefore, Jane should tell Susie about Judah’s debilitating condition, but only if four conditions are present: 1) the danger to the person (Judah) must be real and imminent.  If Judah’s disease would cause his death only thirty years later, then the information may not be revealed;  2) One may not exaggerate the information while disclosing it.  Thus, Jane cannot say that the disease will kill Judah within six months; 3) The motive for revealing the information must be pure, i.e. to help the receiver of the information.  It may not be undertaken for personal gain or for revenge against a person one dislikes; and 4) The information must greatly affect the relationship.  If the friend knows in advance that the couple is so much in love that they will surely marry anyway, it is forbidden to reveal such information.  

It should be noted that if the person can accomplish the same goal without having to break a confidence, then one may not reveal such information in that case.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 45-46

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

At the Seder table, after discussing the miracles of the Exodus, the Weiss family began talking about modern times.  Mrs. Weiss said that there are no miracles today, but her son Jonathan, said that miracles still exist.  As an example, he used the Six-Day War in 1967, in which Israel defeated seven Arab nations in six days.  His older sister, Sharon said it was a miracle when 39 scuds hit Israel during the Gulf War, and only one person died, and even the creation of the state of Israel itself was miraculous.  Mr. Weiss could not make up his mind whether these events are indeed considered miraculous, as his children believe, or whether miracles do not exist today as all, as his wife believes.

Answer

Do miracles exist today?

[a] If, by definition, a miracle is a supernatural event (one which defies the laws of nature), then this type of miracle indeed no longer exists.  The reasons given are: a) people today would not accept these events as miraculous from God due to a lower spiritual level (Berachot 20a) and b) there is no longer a Temple in Jerusalem, where many supernatural miracles occurred on a daily basis.  Soon after the Jews’ dispersion into the Diaspora, which followed the destruction of the first Temple (70 CE), a major event in Jewish history occurred, which shows us how the nature of miracles changed forever.

[b] The Purim story (the story of Mordechai and Esther, which occurred during that time period) was a series of events that certainly were not supernatural.  And yet, these events, which seem political and coincidental in nature, are called miracles.  The prayer recited by Jews to celebrate Purim is called Al Ha-Nissim (“For the miracles”).  Therefore, even though the events of the Purim story do not seem particularly miraculous, or even seem to be from God, they are labeled miracles.  They seem less miraculous even than the Scud missiles of the Gulf War that failed to kill Israelis.  This non-supernatural type became the form of miracles from that point onward in history.  This is also one reason that God’s name is not mentioned in the Book of Esther, making it the only book of the Bible not to contain direct references to God.  This demonstrates that although God was certainly there and was involved in the Miracle of Purim, God’s role was not obvious (as it is in supernatural miracles).  Based on this, Jonathan Weiss is correct that all of these modern events in Jewish history would be considered miraculous.  They are natural miracles like the story of Purim.

[c]  There is a third type of miracle in Judaism as well.  These are everyday events that occur thousands of times.  If any of these events (such as a person taking a single step) were to occur only once, everyone would agree that it is a miracle.  For example, if there were only one baby’s birth or one sunset each year, then everything and everyone would stop to witness these great miracles.  Judaism believes that the fact that these occur daily make them no less miraculous.  We thank God in the Modim prayer of the Amidah for “your miracles that are with us each day.”

It is interesting that in Judaism, of the three types of miracles mentioned, the supernatural is considered the least miraculous.  More miraculous is the natural miracle, while the everyday miracle is the most miraculous of all (see Nedarim 41a, Pesachim 118a).

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 42-44

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Fifteen-year-old David had been caught shoplifting.  When David’s parents’ friends mentioned to them that they had to take some responsibility for David’s actions, they retorted that as Jews, their responsibility ended with David when he became a bar mitzvah (Son of the Commandments.  At age 13, boys in the Jewish tradition become legally responsible for mitzvot (commandments) and for civil matters.  Although general society still recognizes a fifteen-year-old as a minor, Judaism says that David is legally responsible and is independent at the age of thirteen.  Being good Jews, the parents say that they no longer are responsible for David,  The father even recalls reciting the blessing absolving himself of David’s future sins.  

Answer

Is a parent responsible for the actions of a post bar/bat mitzvah child/?

[a] From the Jewish perspective, does a parent bear some responsibility for a post bat or bar mitzvah teenager?  It is certainly true that a child over the age of thirteen is recognized as an adult in Jewish law, and is responsible for his or her actions.  This teen now bears the responsibility and consequences for his or her judgments that lead to his or her actions.  This is made public when a parent recites the blessing at the bar or bat mitzvah ceremony.  “Blessed be the Eternal … Who exonerates me from the sins of this one (child).”  However, we will see that although the child is responsible, the relationship between a parent and child (and thus the parent’s responsibility for the child) is not severed when a child becomes a bat or bar mitzvah.

[b] Even after becoming a bar or bat mitzvah, the mitzvah to honor (and listen to) one’s parents continues throughout one’s life.  In addition, if a child continues to live in a parent’s home (the situation with most teenagers today), Jewish law continues to attach a legal responsibility by a parent for a child.  For example, a lost object found by such a child belongs to the parent and not the teen.  That act of a child living in the parents’ home gives the parents some responsibility.  (Talmud, Bava Metzia 12b and Shulchan Aruch, Chosen Mishpat 270:2).

[c]  The Talmud (Kiddushin 30a) also brings an argument about the optimum age at which a parent has maximum effect on a child.  One opinion is that this takes place between the ages of 16-22, while the other opinion holds that it is between 18-24 years old.  This clearly shows a belief that parents continue to have great influence upon post bar and bat mitzvah children.  In fact, according to Rashi’s commentary on that passage, a parent’s impact at these ages is even greater than before.

[d]  In yet another passage (Shabbat 54b), Judaism holds an adult responsible for all the sins that he or she could have prevented in his or her household but did not prevent. Therefore although David must certainly take responsibility for his act of shoplifting, his parents also continue to bear some responsibility as long as the teen lives in their home.  

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 40-41

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Bernie Schwartz has always been careful to honor his father and grant his requests, both as a good Jew and as a good son.  But recently, Bernie’s father was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and began requesting absurd things from his son.  One day he asked Bernie to stand on his head for twenty minutes.  The next day he asked him to paint the den, even though it had been painted less than six months earlier.

Should Bernie listen to his father and fulfill these strange requests?  Why or why not?

Answer

As Jews we want to honor the Torah’s commandments at all times.  Yet, there are outside and unexpected influences that make us reevaluate exactly how to perform mitzvot.  Consider the following about our case.

[a] Even for perfectly healthy parents, the Midrash (Tanhuma, Eikev 2) says that the mitzvah to honor one’s parents is called the “most difficult commandment in the Torah” to fulfill, and is a mitzvah that is even more important than honoring God (Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 3b).  Technically, the mitzvah regarding parents involves kavod (honor), i.e. , keeping a parent’s dignity by feeding, clothing and helping him or her exit and enter; and yirah (awe), which involves the acts of not sitting or standing in a parent’s place, not contradicting, and not siding publicly against a parent who is in an argument (Kiddushin 31b).  However, most authorities agree that a child is obligated to honor any reasonable request by a parent (Midrash Yalkut Shimoni, Mishle 23 and Shuchan Aruch, Yorah Deah 240:8).

[b] When does a request by a parent become unreasonable?  The Talmud (Kiddushin 31a) cites the case of Rabbi Assi.  His mother was senile, and first she requested that her son bring her jewels, which he did.  Then she requested that he find her a husband, which he tried to do.  But when his mother insisted that Rabbi Assi find her a husband as young and handsome as he was (a very unreasonable request), Rabbi Assi left the house and moved to Israel.  Thus, we see that even this rabbi did not comply with such an unreasonable request.  Maimonides (Hilchot Mamrim 6:10) codifies this idea, and later authorities (Shiurim Mitzuyanim Ba-Halacha 143:4, 10) support the view that irrational requests by parents may be ignored.  Therefore, Bernie Schwartz is not obligated to carry out the absurd requests of his father (although he may do so if he wishes).

[c] It should be noted that if a parent asks a child to violate any Torah law, it is forbidden for the child to comply with the request (Maimonides, Hilchot Mamrim 6:12).

Just as important, however, is the manner in which a child does or does not listen to a parent.  A child must always maintain a parent’s dignity and respect at all times (whether complying or not), even if the parent is no longer competent or fully functioning mentally (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 242:8,13).  The reason is explained in the Talmud (Berachot 8b):  A person who is senile is compared to a Holy Ark that is now empty (of a Torah).  Even though the ark no longer contains holiness, it still must be accorded respect because it once did contain holiness.  So, too, a person who no longer has a fully functioning mind must be accorded respect for what he or she possessed in the past.  Similarly, the Talmud continues, it is for this reason that the shattered first set of tablets of the Ten Commandments was placed in the original Holy Ark along with the second set of tablets.  This demonstrates that something which once had value, but no longer has intrinsic value, must still be accorded respect according to its previous holiness or value. 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 37-39

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver