Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

The Epsteins have spent part of their vacation staying at a posh hotel.  As the great vacation draws to a close, members of the family decide that they want souvenirs from their terrific vacation.  Fifteen-year-old Jonathan decides to pack a hotel towel, with the hotel’s logo, into his suitcase.  His mother decides to bring home the unused bottles of shampoo that are in the bathroom, and eight -year-old Esther takes the stationary and pens from the desk in their room.

Answer

Mr. Epstein is incensed and claims that all these acts are outright stealing.  Jonathan and the others argue that the cost of these momentos are already included in the exorbitant hotel prices, and, besides, everyone does it.  

Is it considered stealing to take objects from a hotel room?  In order to answer this question, we must first define the act of stealing.  What is it?  Most people will simply answer “taking something that does not belong to you.”  But this cannot be a complete definition.  If a child takes food from the refrigerator in his or her home (without asking his or her parents), based on this definition, we can say that this is stealing, since the food does not “belong” to the child.  And lest someone argue that anything which the parents own automatically belongs to the children, then it should be permitted for children to take $100 from their parents’ wallet without asking.  And, yet, almost everyone agrees that taking this money is stealing.  What, then, is the difference between taking food from the refrigerator (not stealing) and taking money from a parent’s wallet (stealing)?

[a] The concept of ye-ush, giving up on having the stolen item returned, or “minding” if it is taken, is the basis of determining if an object is stolen or not according to the Talmud (Sukkah 30a).  If a person is not sure whether the owner would mind (have ye-ush) if something were taken, then the Talmud would disallow taking the items.

[b] Consider what a group of people doing the same thing can do to your sense of morality: “Ten people join together to steal a beam, and are not ashamed in each other’s presence” (Kiddushin 80b). Does the fact that everyone in the family except the father is involved make a difference?

Now let’s get into our case, item by item, since we have now determined that, according to Jewish Law, ye-ush is our test for whether or not something is considered stolen or not.  Before you read our opinions, determine for yourselves: would the hotel management “mind” if you took a towel?  The shampoo? The pen and stationary?

Clearly, most hotels “mind” very much when guests take home the hotel’s towels.  In fact, many hotels SELL their towels in the gift shop.  Thus, taking hotel towels is indeed stealing (unless the owner or manager gives specific permission to take the towels).   

What about the unused shampoo?  Would the hotel “mind” if that is taken?  Numerous surveys show that most hotel management do not mind if the shampoo is taken, since this is included in the cost of the room.  Therefore, taking shampoo is not stealing.

What about the pens and stationary? Here, it is even clearer that the hotel gives away these objects, since they serve to advertise the hotel.  Some hotels even post a sign that the pens and stationary are complimentary.  Clearly, no hotel “minds” when these items are taken.  Therefore, Mr. Epstein is wrong to accuse everyone of stealing.  Jonathan is indeed stealing the hotel towels, but Mrs. Epstein and Esther are not stealing in taking the shampoo and stationary.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 31-33

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Mr. Polsky was walking on the street and saw a friend of his being mugged.  He knew of a Jewish law that states that one must save someone who is in danger.  But he thought that by trying to save this person’s life, he might be putting his own life in danger.

Answer

The questions are: should a person help a friend who is being attacked?  And does the potential danger outweigh the duty, if there is one, to help that friend? 

[a] It certainly is a mitzvah to save a person in danger of dying, as it says, “You shall not stand by the blood of your neighbor” (Leviticus 19:16 and Sanhedrin 73a).

[b] But there is also a mitzvah to preserve one’s own life, as it says “And you shall live by them (The Commandments)” (Leviticus 18:5).  The Talmud expands on this and explains “You shall live by them (the mitzvot) and not die by them” (Sanhedrin 74a).  Therefore, one may not sacrifice one’s life to save someone else.

The real dilemma comes into play, then, when there is definite danger to someone else and only possible danger to you.  Is the obligation to save the person or to keep yourself out of harm’s way? 

[c] The proofs from the stories in the Bible are inconclusive.  On the one hand, in the Book of Exodus, the midwives put themselves in possible danger to save Jewish babies in definitive danger (Exodus 1:16-17) when Pharaoh decrees that Jewish babies should be killed.  Similarly, Esther puts herself in possible danger to save the Jewish people from definite danger (Esther 4:8-5:1).

[d] On the other hand, God specifically tells Moses to wait until he is out of danger before returning to Egypt to save the Jewish people, who are in definite danger: “God said to Moses, ‘Go, return to Egypt, all the people who demand your life have died’” (Exodus 4:19).

[e] The Hagahot Maymaniyot, quoted by the Beth Yosef commentary on the Tur, a Jewish Law code (Choshen Mishpat 426) quotes the Jerusalem Talmud which says that in every case a person must try to save a person in danger because his danger is only a possibility while the danger of the person in distress is definite.

[f] However, the Beit Yosef is also the author of the Code of Jewish Law, the Shulchan Aruch, and never codifies this statement as a law which must be followed.  Thus, he rejects this opinion, as does Mishnah Berurah (Orach Hayyim 329), and says that one may not put him/herself in possible danger to save someone in definite danger.

[g] Based on the above, Rabbi David Ben Zimrah (Egypt, 16th century) concludes that if there is definite danger, one may not even try to save someone.  If it is possible danger, one may try if one wishes, but is not obligated.  If there is no danger, then one is obligated to save a person in danger.  Our only problem now is defining definite, possible, and no danger.  Even if a lifeguard is fully trained and experienced, there always is some danger in trying to save a drowning person.  Does this Halacha imply that the lifeguard should never try to save someone else?  It has been concluded that if the odds of putting oneself in danger are 1 in 10, then this is called a definite danger, and one may not even attempt the rescue.  If the odds are 1 in 100, then this is considered possible danger and one may try to save the person, but need not do so.  Less than 1 in 1000 odds, are not even called possible danger, and one would be obligated to save a person in danger.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 28-30

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Littletown is having a large problem.  Apparently, the sewage from a company that used to be located outside the town’s borders (and has since closed its doors), has been leaking into the entire town.  Cases of cancer and other diseases have become much more prevalent, and everyone is concerned.  Meetings have been called to involve the local and federal governments, and everyone is being asked to put in time to help deal with this issue.  Mr. and Mrs. Kayman, however, are both very busy with full time jobs and do not see the need to get involved.  They have, in the past, been part of the Temple leadership and the rabbi has specifically asked them to put in their time, effort and ideas for this town problem.  When their children ask them to get involved, they explain that their work and personal concerns take precedence over this problem, but the children do not accept their answer.

Answer

The question is whose needs take precedence in Judaism – the private needs of the individual or the needs of the community?

[a] Judaism certainly recognizes the rights and needs of the individual.  According to the Midrash (Bereshit Rabbah 42:13), the very name “Hebrew” (ivri, from the root ayin, vet, reish, meaning “pass over” or “cross the bounds”) originally referred to Abraham, because he stood up and challenged his community.  Mordechai, of the story of Purim, is called Yehudi – a Jew – according to some interpretations because he was an individualist (Midrash Esther Rabbah 4).  However, the Jews’ role as part of the Jewish community is also a very basic principle in Judaism.  

[b] According to the Talmud, (Sanhedrin 17b), a Jewish scholar may not live in a town unless an organized Jewish community exists.  Jews should pray as a community because God cannot reject the prayers of a Jewish community (Berachot 8a).  Every Jew, whether he or she wants to be or not, is part of the larger Jewish world community, as it says, “Kol Yisrael arevim zeh l’zeh” – “Every Jew is connected to every other Jew” (Sanhedrin 27b).

[c] One Talmudic passage shows both the importance of the individual and that of the community.  When the Talmud asks why only one human being was originally created, and not many people, several responses are given. One answer is that unlike coins, where each is an exact duplicate of the original mint, God made each person with features merely similar to those of the original human being.  Each person has different and unique traits.  This demonstrates that we are part of the community of human beings (we share similar features and ancestors), but we remain individuals.

[d] When a person is sitting shiva, it is forbidden for that person to learn Torah.  Torah learning is considered joyous.  However, if the community needs this person to teach Torah, he or she is permitted to do so, since the needs of the community override those of the individual (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 384:1).

Thus, it seems that the Kayman children are correct, and their parents should help with the community problems even if they have to sacrifice some of their own needs.  The Talmud (Berachot 49b) admonishes anyone who disassociates him/herself from the community “Al tifrosh min ha-tzibur.”  In fact, the Talmud (Bava Metzia 91a) speaks about community leaders mentioned at the beginning of the Book of Ruth, who were expected to help their community’s needs during a time of famine.  However, they abdicated their responsibility and moved to the non-Jewish country of Moav.  Shortly thereafter they died as a punishment for their actions.  Based on this, Maimonides (Hilchot Teshuvah 3:11) states that he who abandons his or her community in time of need, loses his or her entire share in the World to Come, even if no specific sin was committed.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pgs. 19-21

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

May or must a Jew give up their life rather than eat non-Kosher food at gunpoint?

Answer

[a] The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) says that for 610 of the 613 mitzvot (commandments), a Jew should violate the commandment and the Torah rather than die.  This is based on the verse “…and you shall live by (performing) them” (Leviticus 8:5), to which the Rabbis of the Talmud (Yoma 85b) add “and not die by observing them (the mitzvot).”

[b] The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) goes on to say that there are three exceptions in which a Jew must give up his or her life rather than commit the sin.  These sins are (1) murder, (2) sexual impropriety, and (3) idol worship.  Therefore, the answer to our question seems quite straightforward: one must eat the non-Kosher food, rather than give up one’s life.  However, there is an exception.  When the entire society is filled with widespread and systematic anti-Semitisim, a Jew may not violate even the simplest act or “minor” commandment – even at the penalty of death – since this act betrays the Jewish people and desecrates God’s name.

May a Jew give up their life rather than eat non-kosher food is much more complicated.  Although it seems that, based on the Talmud, a person does not have permission to decide what to do in such a case, there exist three different opinions among Jewish authorities.

[a] Maimonides (Hlichot Yesodai Torah 5:1) rules that it is always forbidden to give up one’s life in such a circumstance.  One who allows him/herself to be killed rather than eat the non-Kosher food is considered to be the same s a person who committed suicide, which is a sin in Judaism.

[b] Rabbi David ben Zimrah (Egypt, 1479-1573) disagrees and says, “If a person is willing to give up his or her life for Jewish principles, s/he is considered a tzaddik – a righteous person. That person is to be praised.”

[c] Rabbi Yehuda Rozanes (Turkey, 1658-1727), in his book Parshat Derachim, offers a compromise position.  He says that only an established Jewish leader may martyr him/herself when not mandated.  However, a lay person or any other Jew is forbidden to accept death rather than violate any of the other 610 mitzvot.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2”, pg. 6

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

What was the story of Ketiah bar Shalom?  There was a Caesar who hated the Jews. He asked the dignitaries of his kingdom:  “If a wart [a reference to the Jews] develops on someone’s foot, should he cut it off and be healed or leave it and suffer?”

They responded:  “He should cut it off and be healed.”

Ketiah bar Shalom said to them:  “First of all, you will not be able to wipe them out….  Furthermore, you will be called the ruler of a severed kingdom [if you succeed].”

The Caesar said to Ketiah:  “You have spoken well.  However, whoever prevails against the king [in argument] is thrown into a chamber of dirt.”

Why does the king punish Ketiah?  Can we apply this aggada/rabbinic story to our lives?  How many times in our lives do we shut someone down or out because they have pointed out we have erred?  We often compensate with aggressive behavior toward the person to whom we confess. 

As we approach Yom Kippur we should use this time as an opportunity both to admit wrongs and to avoid not adding a layer of anger directed at the person who is trying to help us grow.

It has been a crazy end of the year!  I hope you are all staying safe and being good to yourselves and your loved ones, and I look forward to seeing you in the fall.   

I am looking forward to next year.  We will once again be offering an opportunity to participate in a Jewish learning series, JTalk, which is a ten-week experiential, conversational seminar for students looking to deepen their understanding of Judaism on their own terms.

Come study with me and other students for ten weeks on Tuesday evenings from 5:00-6:30 PM at the Jewish Federation Building in Bloomfield Hills.  The Fellowship will run from Tuesday, September 29 – December 1, and will include dinner, text study, meeting new friends, and $300 upon successful completion of the program.  

Stay tuned for applications!  Have a great summer!

Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Bennie, a twelve-year-old in Florida, had a kidney transplant.  His body begins to reject the kidney, so the doctors dramatically increase the dosage of the anti-rejection medicine.  The medicine makes the boy sleepy.  It blurs his vision.  It makes it hard for him to concentrate.  He can’t really read, watch television or play video games.  Even visiting with friends is hard, because his eyes become very light sensitive.  He and his mother decide he should go off the medicine and take his chances.  He says, “Living this way is not living.”  The doctors call it “suicide” and “parental abandonment of responsibility.”  Bennie and his mother argue that it is his life.  The doctors go to court.  The court orders the family to continue medical treatment.  Can a twelve-year-old (with his mother’s permission) make a decision to reject the medical treatment that will keep him alive?  Should he?

Answer

[a] When Rabbi Yehuda ha-Nasi was dying the rabbis ruled that everyone must fast and pray for God’s mercy.  They also made it a rule that anyone who said “The rabbi is already dead” would be put to death as a murderer.  Then the rabbi’s servant woman went onto the roof of his house and prayed, “The angels and people are at war.  The angels are praying for the rabbi to come and join them.  The people are praying for the rabbi to remain with them.  Prayers are fighting prayers.  God, may it be Your will that the human prayers defeat the angels’ wishes.”

Later, when the servant woman saw how much the rabbi was suffering, she prayed again.  This time she said, “May it be Your will, God, that the angels win.”  Rabbi suffered more and more but stayed alive.  The servant woman picked up a jar and threw it off the roof.  It hit the ground and made a big smashing sound.  The rabbis stopped praying for just an instant.  In that instant the soul of Rabbi Yehudah ha-Nasi departed for its eternal rest (Ketuvot 104a).

[b] Rabbinic thinking leans to the view that the patient should undergo a procedure if the choice exists.  Nevertheless, he may exercise the option to do nothing.  

A central factor to be considered is the track record of the treatment.  The less sure the doctors are of the possible cure, the greater is the patient’s prerogative to not have the procedure.  In those cases where the doctors are not confident of the outcome, one can choose to live whatever amount of time he has left and not take a chance on losing even that short time, or he can take a chance that he will lose everything – but might gain a lot.

Rav Moshe Feinstein has taught a number of times in his responsa that a patient has a right to refuse treatment and that a person is not required to undergo treatment that will cure his illness but force him a life of pain.  He teaches that the decision is really in the hands of the patient, who is entitled to know all the options and make his own decision.

Even against the patient’s express will, however, he must be provided food and oxygen.  However, we must act upon a request for a stopping of further medical treatment, even if this will bring a quicker death (Rabbi Alfred Cohen).

Jewish medical ethics would encourage Bennie to go back to his treatment but accept his decision to refuse the medication.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 70-72

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

On [the tv show] ER, a seventeen-year-old cystic fibrosis patient, a boy, is near the end of his life.  He wants to die in peace. He wants to have a DNR order placed. There is no question that he will die soon.  He wants to die peacefully. His mother (and his sister) can’t live with his decision. So when the doctor allows him to die peacefully, according to his wishes, they order him to restart his heart and insert a breathing tube.  By American law, the child is still a minor, and the doctor has to follow the mother’s wishes.

Answer

[a] Under Jewish law, a dying person can ask for a DNR (The death of Rabbi Judah, Ketubot 104a).

[b] Also, under Jewish law, the commandment “Honor your father and mother” applies at any age, so the question of whether a seventeen-year-old is an adult doesn’t matter.

In the Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De’ah 241.25 says that you can disobey your mother over choices of schooling and marriage (major life issues).  When to die probably falls under this category. 

[c] Also, the Rashi commentary to Leviticus 19:2 makes it clear that you need not follow your parents’ wishes when they violate the Torah.  Based on the Seven Laws of Noah (Sanhedrin 56a) causing an animal to suffer tzar ba’alei hayyim (causing pain to animals) is a biblical prohibition.

The mother’s wishes here are probably wrong and need not be followed.

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 118-119

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver

Here’s another ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

Max bought a brand new BB gun.  He and “the folks” had gone through all the rules about what he could shoot at and what he could not.  He had agreed that living things were out of bounds. No birds. No squirrels. No snakes – unless someone was in danger.  That left almost nothing. He spent a week safely knocking cans off a wall. Now he was bored. He went into the garage and found a really old set of dishes.  No one even remembered where they came from. He set up the dishes and had lots of fun breaking the plates safely. Mom came out and yelled at him. She agreed that he was following all the rules but added a new one: “You can’t break useful things.”  He said, “That is ridiculous. I should be able to break anything no one in the family wants anymore.” Mom argued, “Somebody might want them someday.” Max said, “They are ours – we can do with them what we want.”

Answer

[a] In the Torah it says: “You may not cut down fruit trees when you lay siege to a city.” (Deut. 20:19-20)

[b] In the Talmud that becomes a law called Ba’al Tashchit: “It is forbidden to destroy vessels or garments, or tear down buildings or clog up wells, or waste food in a destructive manner.” (Kiddushin 32a)

[c] The Shulchan Arukh makes this even clearer.  It says, “You cannot waste anything which other people will find useful.” (Laws of Body and Soul, 14)

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge”, pgs. 116-117

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver