12.24.20


Here’s an ethical issue and Jewish source response:

Case

A shootout between a mugger and a policeman results in the officer being wounded.  He is wheeled into the ER, and needs an operation to stop the internal bleeding.  His fellow police officers and his family are with him at the hospital; everyone is pushing for the officer to be treated right away.  Five minutes later, the criminal who shot him is also brought to the ER, having been shot by the policeman.  He is in much greater need of an operation.  The doctor on duty orders two operating rooms, but only one is available.

Answer

Should the doctor give the operating room to the criminal, who needs the operation more and whose life is in greater danger, or to the policeman, who is not a criminal and whose family is present, encouraging the doctor to treat him right away? 

[a] Of course, there is a general mitzvah to save the life of as many people as possible.  Even if the person is not an upstanding individual, he or she is created “in the image of God” – b’tzelem Elohim.  However, in our case, when only one operating room is available, the doctor must choose whom to save.  

Common sense tells us to save the policeman since 1) he is the more moral person and 2) he will continue to save lives if he survives, while the criminal might continue to hurt others.  But common sense and logic are not always the guiding principles when it comes to defining Jewish laws and values.

[b] Even though it is clear to us that the man is the perpetrator of a crime, no person or doctor may act as a judge and pronounce the person guilty prior to a legal trial.  This basic concept familiar to us as “innocent until proven guilty” is based on a verse in the Torah (Numbers 35:12) which states that punishment cannot be administered until after a trial.  Maimonides (Hilchot Rotzeach 1:5) says that no punishment may be administered by witnesses (even if they are judges by profession) at the scene of a crime, until a person has gone through the entire legal process.  Would the doctor, by choosing the policeman, already be pronouncing judgment on the alleged criminal?

[c] The Talmud (Sanhedrin 74a) teaches that a person is not permitted to say, or even to believe that one person’s “blood is redder than another’s.”  This means no human being is capable of judging who is more valuable than whom.  We cannot truly see inside a person to evaluate all of the conditions that led to particular behaviors.  Only God can do this.  Therefore, the doctor cannot decide who gets the operation room on past behavior or higher morality.  

[d] The Talmud discusses a case like ours (Sanhedrin 32b).  Two identical boats are traveling in opposite directions, trying to cross a narrow channel, which has room for only one boat.  The first option should be to compromise.  Failing that, the boat that is closer, that arrived first, goes first.  In our case, where compromise is impossible, the policeman should therefore be taken to the operating room because he arrived first.  However, the case of the boats is predicated on the situation where the needs are identical, but in our case the needs are not identical.  

[e] The person in greater danger of losing life always takes precedence, based on the dictum (Ketubot 12b), “a sure thing versus a possible thing – a sure thing is preferred.”  (Here the “sure thing” is the need for the operation in order to survive.)   Therefore, although intuitively we may WANT to save the policeman, the criminal should get the operating room, since both his need and his danger are greater.  

 

Joel Grishaver, “You Be the Judge 2,” pgs. 55-57

Used with permission from Joel Grishaver